Advanced persistent threats (APTs) are stealthy attacks which make use of social engineering and deception to give adversaries insider access to networked systems. Against APTs, active defense technologies aim to create and exploit information asymmetry for defenders. In this paper, we study a scenario in which a powerful defender uses honeypots for active defense in order to observe an attacker who has penetrated the network. Rather than immediately eject the attacker, the defender may elect to gather information. We introduce a Markov decision process on a continuous state space in order to model the defender's problem. We find a threshold of information that the defender should gather about the attacker before ejecting him. Then we study the robustness of this policy using a Stackelberg game. Our results provide a quantitative foundation for studying optimal timing for attacker engagement in network defense.
INTRODUCTION
Traditional cybersecurity techniques such as firewall defense and role-based access control have been shown to be insufficient against advanced and persistent threats (APTs). Recent breaches of the Democratic National Committee [9] and the U.S. Office of Personal Management [2] have highlighted that advanced (possibly state-sponsored) actors are capable of undermining these defenses through social engineering and zero-day exploits. Using techniques such as spear-phishing or direct physical access (as in, for instance, the Stuxnet attacks [12] ), intruders establish themselves within a network. Then they leverage footholds within the network to escalate privileges and move towards a target asset.
Active Cyber Defense and Honeynets
Traditional passive cyber defenses struggle to overcome information asymmetry which works in favor of attackers. The U.S. Department of Defense has defined active cyber defense as "synchronized, real-time capability to discover, detect, analyze, and mitigate threats and vulnerabilities... Figure 1 : An example of a honeynet employed in a process control network. Normal nodes consist of routers, databases, sensors, automatic controllers, and actuators. At the top right, a honeynet disguised as a set of sensors and controllers records activity in order to learn about attackers who have penetrated the network. using sensors, software, and intelligence..." [6] . These techniques attempt to investigate attackers as well as use defensive deception in order to manipulate the beliefs of the adversary [8] .
Honeynets and virtual attack surfaces are emerging techniques which accomplish both purposes. They create false network views for an attacker in order to lure the attacker into a designated part of a network where he can be contained and observed within a controlled environment [1] . Engaging with an attacker in order to gather information allows defenders to update their threat models and develop more effective defenses. Figure 1 gives a conceptual example of a honeypot placed within a process control network within critical infrastructure or a SCADA 1 system.
Timing in Attacker Engagement
Of course, engaging an attacker discovered in a network comes at the risk of added exposure. This gives rise to an interesting trade-off between information gathering and shortterm security. How long should administrators allow an attacker to remain in a honeypot before ejecting the attacker? How long should they attempt to lure an attacker from an operational system to a honeypot? Our work focuses specifically on these questions of timing.
Contributions
We made the following principle contributions:
1. We introduce a Markov decision process to model at-1 Secure Control and Data Acquisition tacker lateral movement constrained by a defender who can eject the attacker from the network at any time, or allow him to remain in the network in order to lure him to a honeypot and gather information.
2. We analytically obtain the value function and optimal policy for the defender, and verify these numerically.
In equilibrium, we obtain the threshold of information gathering that should be performed by the defender before ejecting the attacker.
3.
To test the robustness of the optimal policy, we develop a zero-sum, Stackelberg game model in which the attacker leads by choosing a parameter of the game. We obtain a bound on the worst-case utility for the defender.
Related Work
Game-theoretic design of honeypot deployment has been an active research area. Signaling games are used to model attacker beliefs about whether nodes are honeypots or normal systems in [4, 7] . Honeynet deployment from a network point of view is systematized in [1] . Ref. [5] develops a network model for attacker lateral movements and formulates a zero-sum game by which an automated defense agent protects a network asset. Our work fits within the context of these efforts, but we specifically focus on questions of timing. Other recent work has studied timing for the case of static interactions [10] . But we specifically focus on optimizing the balance for a defender between the risks and rewards of investigation of an observed attacker.
OPTIMAL INVESTIGATION MODEL
An attacker A moves throughout a network containing nodes which are either honeypots or normal systems. A does not know the type of the systems. On the other hand, we study an intelligent defender D who observes the attacker and knows the type of system.
At any time, A can choose to change to another system, although he also does not know the type of the other system. D cannot force A to change systems, but at any time D can eject A from the network. D faces a trade-off between the benefits of continuing to observe A as he passes through honeypots and the risks of information loss when A passes through normal systems.
Let ℵ0 denote the cardinality of the set of natural numbers. Then define TA = T 0
where, for each i ∈ 0, 1, 2, . . . , T i A denotes the duration of time that A plans to wait at the i th node before changing to a new node 2 . In this section, we model the defender's decision of how long to allow A to remain in honeypots or to attract A from a honeypot to a normal system, before ejecting him from the network.
State Space
Let S ∈ {H, N } denote a system in which A is located in the network: either a honeypot (H) or a normal system (N ). In addition, let S = L denote that A has left the network. L can also be called a cemetery state. We denote all three options by S = {H, N, L}. Ejection 0 Figure 2 : A moves throughout a network between honeypots H and normal systems N. D can earn a total of U 0 utility for investigating A. For timesteps in which A is in a honeypot, D learns about A and the residual utility for future investigation decreases. In this example, D ejects A from the network at stage i = 4.
Let U 0 denote the total amount of utility that D can gain from investigating A. This is meant to model decreasing returns from extended observation of the attacker. Let U ∈ U [0, U 0 ] denote a residual utility available to D for investigating A after some interactions have occurred. U constitutes a state of they system, since D uses U to compute the benefits of further investigation. The state space is now U × S. The interaction is summarized by Fig. 2 . The vertical dimension represents the residual utility U ∈ U. The horizontal axis is time. The type of system is represented by the colored regions: red for S = H and green for S = N. D allows A to remain in the network until stage i = 4, at which point he ejects A.
One-Stage Actions and Rewards
When A arrives at each new system, D decides how long to wait before ejecting A from the network. Let τD ∈ R+ denote the period of time that D decides to wait. Define Ca < 0 as the loss per unit time that D suffers while A resides in normal systems. Let C k < 0 denote the cost per unit time that D must pay while A is in a honeypot 3 .
Define the function µD : U × S × R 2 + → R such that µD(U, S, τA, τD) gives the one-stage reward to D if A is in a system S with residual utility U, and A plans to wait for τA while D plans to wait 4 for τD. Here, µD is a function of the residual utility because D can receive at most U for investigating A. We have
Lemma 2.1 obtains the one-stage optimal action for D.
and note that arg max may be set-valued. For a single stage, given τA,
Proof. This follows from Eq. (1) and the assumption that U/r > C k . Now assume that there exists a stage at which D ejects A out from the network. At this stage, D optimizes only his one-stage utility. First, if A is in a honeypot and τA ≤ rU/U 0 , then it is optimal for D not to eject A before τA. The game will continue. Second, D will optimally choose τD = rU/U 0 if A is in a honeypot and U < τAU 0 /r. Third, if A is in a normal system, then the optimal action for D is to eject A immediately: τD = 0. Finally, note that at all stages in which D does not eject A out of the network, µD is the same for any τD ≥ τA.
Therefore, consider the following reduced strategy space for D. Let AC denote allowing A to continue in the network, and let AQ denote ejecting A from the network. Then define A = {AC , AQ}, and let A ∈ A denote an action of D in general. Lemma 2.1 implies that AC is equivalent to choosing τD ≥ τA, and that AQ is equivalent to choosing τD = 0 if S = N and τD = rU/U 0 if A is in a honeypot and U <TAU 0 /r.
In addition, consider the reduced reward functionμ i D :
Next, we define the transition probabilities and state the optimality criteria.
Transition Probabilities
If A is already out of the network, then he remains out of the network. If A is in the network and D plays AQ, then A is sent out of the network. Otherwise, if D plays AC , then A arrives randomly at a normal system or a honeypot. Let p denote the probability that he arrives at a normal system. Finally, the residual utility decreases if A is in a honeypot, but remains the same if he is in a normal system.
For stage i ∈ 0, 1, 2, . . . , define q i : U×S → [0, 1] such that q i (U , S | U, S, A) gives the probability of transitioning from (U, S) to (U , S ) given action A. For brevity, let Φ(U,
Infinite-Horizon, Undiscounted Reward
For D, define the deterministic feedback policy θ : U×S → A such that A = θ(U, S) gives the action that D plays for residual utility U and system type S. Let Θ denote the space of all such policies.
For stage i ∈ 0, 1, 2, . . . , define the expected infinite-horizon, undiscounted reward by V i θ : U × S → R such that V i θ (U, S) gives the expected reward from stage i onward for using the policy θ when the residual utility is U and the type of the system is S. This is given by
where the states transition according to Eq. (2). The overall problem for D is to find given an initial system type S 0 ∈ {H, N }, is to find θ † such that, ∀U ∈ U, ∀S ∈ S, ∀i ∈ 0, 1, 2, . . . ,
Since the utility function is undiscounted, we require Proposition 2.2.
Proposition 2.2. The expected reward for the optimal policy is finite.
Proof. See Appendix A.
It is also convenient to define the value function or costto-go
At any stage i and state (U, S), V i (U, S) is the maximum expected utility that can be earned over all time. The Bellman principle implies that for an optimal policy θ † , ∀i ∈ 0, 1, 2, . . . , [3] θ † (U, S) ∈ arg max
OPTIMAL DEFENDER POLICY
In this section, we solve the dynamic optimization problem for D for a constant attacker action, i.e., T 0
T A. This means that µ i D ≡ µD, q i ≡ q, and V i ≡ V. Define the following notation:
Note that δ and δ 
Value Function
First, it is obvious that V(U, L) = 0 for all U, because no further utility can be earned in the cemetery state. Next, note that V(0, S) = 0 for both S = H and S = N. No further utility can be earned in either type of system. D will play AQ in a normal system, and will play either action in a honeypot. In both cases, the cost-to-go is zero. The solution proceeds by solving for V backwards in U from U = 0 to U = U 0 . Before formally stating the value function, consider several definitions. Define the function f D 1 : U → R by
Then define the quantity ω ∈ R+ such that
Next, let k1[U ]
Finally, Theorem 3.1 states the complete value function 
Proof. See Appendix B. Figure 3 gives an example of the value function. For low values of U, if A is in a normal system, then it is optimal for D to eject A since little remains to be gained by attracting him to a honeypot. This is why V(U, N ) = 0 for U ≤ ω. For U > ω, it is optimal for D to allow A to remain in his current node forTA before changing to the next node, in the hopes that the next node will be a honeypot. Therefore, V(U, N ) > 0 for U > ω. The value for honeypots, V(U, H), takes the form f D 1 for low U and f D 2 for high U 5 . The transition in V(U, H) is due to the transition in V(U, N ), which is relevant because the next system at which A arrives may be a normal system.
Optimal Policy Function
Theorem 3.2 summarizes the optimal policy based on the value function. 5 Appendix B explains why the transition occurs at ω + δ rather than at ω. Proof. The optimal policy θ † (U, S) from Eq. 3 is the one that maximizes the sum of the immediate reward and the expected value at the next state.
First consider honeypots. For U < δ, D ejects A from the system after depleting the residual utility to 0 (which we denote by θ † (U, H) = AQ). For U ≥ δ, θ † (U, H) = AC , because the value function is always positive. In normal systems, θ † (U, N ) = AC when the value function is positive, but θ † (U, N ) = 0 when the value function is zero. In fact, the transition occurs when U < ω.
Of course, the value function and optimal policy are functions of the parameters of the game. One of these parameters, in particular, can be controlled by the attacker. This isTA, the period of time for which A remains at each node. Therefore, let us write V θ (U, S |TA) and θ † (U, S, |TA) to denote the dependence of the value and optimal policy, respectively, onTA. Next, defineV : R+ → R such thatV(TA) gives the expected utility to D for playing θ † as a function ofTA. This gives us Corollary 3.3. 
ROBUSTNESS EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluation the robustness of the attacker engagement policy θ † by the attacker to choose the worst-caseTA for the defender, i.e., the one which minimizes Eq. (8). In fact, this is a zero-sum Stackelberg equilibrium, given by Definition 4.1 [11] . 
and ∀U ∈ U, ∀S ∈ S,
Note that Eq. (10) simply restates the requirement for the optimal policy in an MDP which is found in Eq. (3) . This is a function of the attacker strategyT * A . Equation (9) states that A must chooseT * A to minimizeV θ * , knowing that θ * will be chosen by D based onT * A . The attacker's problem can also be stated bȳ
In fact,V θ * (TA) takes two possible forms, based on the values of δ and ω defined in Eq. (4) and Eq. (6), respectively. Theorem 4.2. (Value as a function ofTA) First, consider the case that δ < ω. In this case, forTA ≥ r,
and forTA < r,
Second, consider the case that δ > ω. DefineTω asTA such that U 0 = ω. In this case, forTA ≥Tω,
for r ≤TA <Tω,
Proof. See Appendix C.
Note that Eq. (11) and Eq. (13) are the same, and that Eq. (12) and Eq. (15) are the same. The difference is simply which one is lower. Corollary 4.3 summarizes both cases. 
(16) 6 We say approximated because we have not analytically proved that the oscillations asTA → 0 do not include a transient value below U 0 + r C k + Ca p 1−p for δ < ω or (U0 + rC k ) (1 − p) for δ > ω.
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
V θ * (T * A ) as given in Eq. (16) provides a guaranteed minimum value for D as a function of the game parameters. Intuitive relationships can be verified; the utility decreases in the absolute values of C k and Ca, as well as in the proportion p of normal systems. Moreover, by requiringV θ * (T * A ) ≥ 0, parameters can be designed which allow D to obtain positive utility even for the worst-caseT * A . Remaining future work includes adding an underlying network structure and modeling attacker beliefs over the types of systems he visits. This should provide further insights into quantitative models of attacker engagement as part of active defense.
APPENDIX

A. PROOF OF FINITE EXPECTED VALUE
Proof. The maximum value of V i θ (U, S) is achieved if A only visits honeypots. In this case, V i θ (U, S) = U 0 + rC k , so the expected utility is bounded from above. If D chooses a poor policy (for example, θ(U, S) = AC for all U ∈ U and S ∈ S), then V i θ (U, S) can be unbounded below. On the other hand, D can always guarantee V i θ (U, S) = 0 (for example, by choosing θ(U, S) = AQ for all U ∈ U and S ∈ S). Therefore, the value of the optimal policy is certainly bounded from below as well as from above. It is finite. More specifically, we have defined ω as the U which makes the argument on the right side equal to zero. Thus, we have 
B. VALUE FUNCTION DERIVATION
A bit of algebra gives V(U, H)[kδ, (k + 1) δ] =
Solving this recursive equation for the case of
Then
but the last term is simply f D 1 (U − k1δ) . Substituting from Eq. (17) gives f D 2 (U ).
C. PROOF OFV θ * (TA)
Proof. First, consider the expected value asTA → 0. As TA → 0, ω and δ decrease, so U 0 > ω + δ, and the value functions follow f D 2 . So we find the limit of f D 2 asTA → 0. AsTA → 0, k[U 0 ] − k1[U 0 ] remains finite, but δ D 1 → 0, and δk[U 0 ] approaches U 0 . Therefore, the first two terms of f D 1 approach zero:
Finally, the last term is given by
AsTA → 0, we have
Now, manipulation of Corollary 3.3 yields
But asTA → 0, the second term approaches zero. Thus V θ † (TA) approaches the quantity given in Eq. (19). Note that we have not specified whether δ < ω. Therefore, we have proved Eq. (12) and Eq. (15). Next, we examine the expected value at highTA. There are several cases. First, consider the case that δ < ω and TA ≥ r. The second condition implies that D keeps A in the first honeypot that he enters until all residual utility is exhausted, which produces U 0 + rC k utility. The first condition implies that r >Tω, soTA >Tω, which means that D ejects A from the first normal system that he enters, which produces 0 utility. The weighted sum of these utilities gives Eq. (11).
Next, consider the case that δ > ω andTA ≥ r. The second condition still implies that D keeps A in the first honeypot that he enters until all residual utility is exhausted and ears produces U 0 + rC k utility. The first condition, though, implies that r <Tω, so we do not know whether or notTA ≥Tω. In the sub-case thatTA ≥Tω, D again ejects A from the first normal system that he enters, and we have Eq. (13). In the sub-case thatTA <Tω, we have V (U, N ) [0, δ] = U χ D H −TAλ D N = U 0 + rC k −TA Ca 1 − p Therefore, the total expected utility is
which, reduced, yields Eq. (14).
